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Abstract
Background: There has been an increase in 'risk sharing' schemes for pharmaceuticals between healthcare institutions 
and pharmaceutical companies in Europe in recent years as an additional approach to provide continued 
comprehensive and equitable healthcare. There is though confusion surrounding the terminology as well as concerns 
with existing schemes.
Methods: Aliterature review was undertaken to identify existing schemes supplemented with additional internal 
documents or web-based references known to the authors. This was combined with the extensive knowledge of 
health authority personnel from 14 different countries and locations involved with these schemes.
Results and discussion: A large number of 'risk sharing' schemes with pharmaceuticals are in existence incorporating 
both financial-based models and performance-based/outcomes-based models. In view of this, a new logical definition 
is proposed. This is "risk sharing' schemes should be considered as agreements concluded by payers and pharmaceutical 
companies to diminish the impact on payers' budgets for new and existing schemes brought about by uncertainty and/or the 
need to work within finite budgets". There are a number of concerns with existing schemes. These include potentially 
high administration costs, lack of transparency, conflicts of interest, and whether health authorities will end up funding 
an appreciable proportion of a new drug's development costs. In addition, there is a paucity of published evaluations 
of existing schemes with pharmaceuticals.
Conclusion: We believe there are only a limited number of situations where 'risk sharing' schemes should be 
considered as well as factors that should be considered by payers in advance of implementation. This includes their 
objective, appropriateness, the availability of competent staff to fully evaluate proposed schemes as well as access to IT 
support. This also includes whether systematic evaluations have been built into proposed schemes.
Background
Expenditure on pharmaceuticals is rising more rapidly
than other components of health care with costs of can-
cer products growing at 21% per annum in recent years
[1-5]. This will continue with ongoing demographic
changes, instigation of stricter clinical targets and the
continued launch of new expensive drugs [5-8]. Increas-
ingly, though there are concerns with the level of health
gain of new drugs with a median of just 0.097 Quality
Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) versus current standards in
an analysis of 281 recent submissions by pharmaceutical
companies to the Scottish Medicines Consortium [9].
This compares with the public perception that many new
drugs are seen as breakthroughs [10].
European governments and health authorities have
introduced successive reforms and initiatives to address
these challenging resource issues including funding new
premium priced innovative drugs. These include mea-
sures to engineer low prices for generics and originators
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as well as interchangeable brands within a class [2,11-16].
They also include steps to improve transparency in classi-
fying new drugs as innovative, linking the perceived
d e g r e e  o f  i n n o v a t i o n  o f  n e w  p r o d u c t s  t o  r e i m b u r s e d
prices, and limiting payer exposure to new expensive
drugs given their potential significant budget impact
[11,13,17-23]. Not surprisingly, optimising the use of new
expensive technologies is seen as the major challenge
faced by health services in Europe as they strive to con-
tinue providing comprehensive and equitable healthcare
[6].
Current schemes to limit the growth in pharmaceutical
expenditure, ensure health gain is maximised within
finite budgets, or both including limiting 'off label' pre-
scribing and prescribing outside identified sub-popula-
tions where the value of the technology is greatest. They
also include price-volume agreements (PVAs), patient
access schemes where typically drugs are provided free
for a period of time, 'coverage with evidence develop-
ment' schemes as well as payment by result schemes
based on outcomes achieved in practice. These latter
schemes are also known as performance-based contracts,
efficiency stipulation schemes or effectiveness guarantee
schemes [13,19-22,24-35]. All of these schemes have been
included within the general term 'risk sharing schemes'
either by payers or pharmaceutical companies.
The number and range of risk sharing schemes have
grown in recent years no doubt enhanced by patient and
physician pressure on governments to accelerate access to
new and more costly medicines despite often significant
uncertainty surrounding their likely health benefit
[10,36]. This may well be exacerbated by pharmaceutical
companies keen to address lost revenues from patent
expires, which have recently been estimated at over
US$100 bn per year over the next four years [37]. Payers
though need to consider the opportunity costs of risk
sharing schemes if available resources are not used wisely
[36,38].
Further supply side and demand side initiatives are
essential if Europe is to maintain the ideals of socially
funded and equitable healthcare. This could mean further
expansion of risk sharing schemes. There have been a
number of papers published recently that have compre-
hensively reviewed existing and historic risk sharing
schemes offering suggestions for the future
[5,10,20,34,36,39]. However, there is still considerable
confusion surrounding the terminology, which urgently
needs to be addressed. There are also concerns among
health authority personnel with the level of administra-
tive intensity associated with some of the current
schemes and that they could end up contributing sub-
stantially to the development costs of new molecules
[5,40,41]. Certainly in the past, a great deal of the risk
associated with outcomes of coverage decisions have
been borne by health authorities and insurance compa-
nies [34]. This is starting to change given the number of
new expensive technologies being launched coupled with
their budget impact [6,23,34]. These challenges are mag-
n i f i e d  b y  t h e  l a c k  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  s t u d i e s  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e
implementation and outcome of many existing schemes
for pharmaceuticals in terms of their overall costs and
benefits [10,34]. This has not been the case with non-
pharmacological technologies where 17 policy outcomes
have been derived to date from 32 principally non-drug
technologies, with in approximately 60% of cases the cov-
erage decision consistent with the outcomes of the study
conducted as part of the schemes [34].
Benefits of risk sharing schemes include enhancing
health gain within available resources as well as address-
ing issues such as the safety of new products in practice
[10]. These benefits though have to be balanced against
concerns for patient care if new drugs are launched too
early with considerable uncertainty regarding their safety
as well as potentially paying for cost-ineffective technolo-
gies (type I error) [36].
We believe these concerns need to be discussed and
debated before there is a continuing surge in 'risk sharing'
schemes. This paper aims to stimulate this debate by:
• Proposing logical definitions which can act as a ref-
erence for the future
• Documenting exemplars from the published litera-
ture to illustrate proposed definitions supplemented 
with additional examples from the co-authors
• Documenting the published impact, concerns and 
outcomes from current schemes from a payer per-
spective
• Summarising considerations that should be borne in 
mind by payers when contemplating future schemes
• Proposing guidance on key criteria for considering 
future risk sharing schemes again from a payer per-
spective
Methodology
A literature review was undertaken by one of the authors
(BG) in PubMed, MEDLINE and EMBASE between 2000
and February 2010 using key words. These were 'condi-
tional coverage', 'conditional reimbursement', 'risk shar-
ing', 'coverage with evidence', 'price volume agreements',
'value-based pricing, pharmaceuticals', 'no cure no pay',
'pay back schemes', 'health impact guarantee' and 'out-
come guarantee'. This was supplemented by unpublished
or "grey literature" references known to the 16 co-authors
from European countries and locations involved with
considering, evaluating and/or implementing such
schemes. The focus is principally on Europe although
other schemes relating to pharmaceuticals are also docu-
mented for Australia, Canada and the US to provide addi-
tional examples.Adamski et al. BMC Health Services Research 2010, 10:153
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Only papers documenting the nature and content of
actual schemes were considered for possible inclusion in
this paper. There was no attempt to assess the quality of
published papers using established criteria such as the
Cochrane Collaboration criteria [42]. This was because
t h i s  i s  a  ' c o r r e s p o n d e n c e '  a r t i c l e  u n d e r t a k e n  b y  h e a l t h
authority and health insurance personnel evaluating and
implementing such schemes rather than a comprehensive
review of all risk sharing schemes undertaken as such
reviews have recently been published [10,20,34].
The schemes were subsequently collated under the pro-
posed definitions to provide guidance to health authority
and health insurance personnel as these are the principal
intended audience for this paper. Gaps in the knowledge
base have been identified with suggestions for the future.
Where possible, Euros are quoted; however, some fig-
u r e s  a r e  q u o t e d  i n  G B £ s  a n d  U S  $  ( €1 = US$1.36,
GB£0.90, SEK9.70 - 3 March 2010).
Definitions
We propose 'risk sharing' schemes for pharmaceuticals
should be considered as agreements concluded by payers
and pharmaceutical companies to diminish the impact on
the payer's budget of new and existing medicines brought
about by either the uncertainty of the value of the medi-
cine and/or the need to work within finite budgets. In
practice, the agreement lies in setting the scope and real-
izing the mutual obligations amongst both payers and
pharmaceutical companies depending on the occurrence
of an agreed condition - the "risk". The "risk" varies by sit-
uation, and can include pharmaceutical expenditure
higher than agreed thresholds or health gain from a new
product lower in practice reducing its value.
We recognise our definition is different to the defini-
tion recently proposed by Towse and Garrison - namely
these are 'agreements between a payer and a pharmaceu-
tical company where the price level and/or revenue
received is related to the future performance of the prod-
uct in either a research or real-world environment'
[36].However our efforts have been directed towards
finding a definition coherently overarching the many
agreements introduced in previous years as well as one
acceptable to health authority and health insurance per-
sonnel. Consequently, we believe it is essential to create a
definition according to rules of a logical division. These
are firstly that there is only one basis of the division. Sec-
ondly, every subject belongs to only one group, where
there may be sub-categories of equal rank. Thirdly, every
example form the superior group, i.e. risk-sharing
schemes, has to fall into either category, i.e. either finan-
cial based or performance based.
All the schemes discussed and proposed should have a
common denominator that is the "risk shared by the
payer and the pharmaceutical company". What differenti-
ates the various schemes is the nature of the risk, i.e. "a
probable situation in future". Based on our proposed defi-
nition, the many existing 'risk-sharing' schemes can be
subdivided into either financial/financial-based models
or outcome/performance-based models. This is broader
than the definition proposed by Towse and Garrison,
which just covers performance-based schemes. However,
it is a workable definition from a payer perspective.
Even this division, despite being based on common
naming, may be misleading though because it suggests
that outcome or performance-based models have little to
do with expenditure. In fact, the opposite can be true
with price-volume agreements and other financial
schemes often having little to do with patient outcomes,
concentrating more on keeping expenditure within
agreed limits and/or enhancing the value proposition of
the new product. Price capping schemes do though bring
in an outcome element.
The various examples of risk sharing scheme included
within the proposed definition are:
• Financial based schemes:
+ Price-volume agreements (PVAs)/budget impact 
schemes. These focus on controlling financial 
expenditure with pharmaceutical companies 
refunding over budget situations
+ Patient access schemes. These typically involve 
either free drug or discounts for an agreed period 
to enhance the value of new medicines and 
improve the possibility of their funding/reim-
bursement. Patient access schemes also include 
price-capping schemes, which focus on control-
ling the financial impact but from an individual 
patient perspective. Typically drugs are provided 
free once patients have exceeded an agreed utili-
sation limit to again enhance reimbursement/
funding within finite resources
+ Performance based/outcome-based models. These 
can include schemes whereby companies refund 
agreed monies or provide free drug if the desired out-
comes are not reached. Alternatively, a price reduc-
tion if the new drug fails to deliver the desired health 
gain in practice. In reality, the latter is likely to lead to 
price shifting from payers to manufacturers as new 
drugs may well not be able to fully reproduce the 
desired benefits once prescribed in a wider popula-
tion than those in the clinical trials, i.e. the net mone-
tary benefit is lower in reality
Existing schemes
As discussed, we believe all existing schemes can be col-
lated into two groups; namely financial/financial-based
models or performance-based/outcomes-based models.
Examples of financial-based models include price-vol-
ume agreements (PVA) - sometimes referred to as budgetA
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Table 1: Examples of Price Volume Agreements (PVAs)/budget impact schemes in Australia and Europe
Country Examples
Australia PVAs have been in place for a number of years in Australia with price reductions if sales exclude pre-agreed volumes as well as rebate arrangements if costs exceed a subsidised 
cap or threshold
More than 50 such 'risk sharing' arrangements have been instigated to date
Belgium A payback mechanism has existed since 2002, with the regulation written into the legislation
Originally, each pharmaceutical company paid an advanced percentage of their sales based on anticipated expenditure and the previous year's sales
Refunds were subsequently adjusted based on real expenditure, with pharmaceutical companies and insurers making up part (65%) of any realized excess
In 2006, the payback system for exceeding expenditure was replaced by a "Provision fund" system where a fund of € 100 mn was created through advances paid by 
pharmaceutical companies, with companies covering 75% of any over run
Additional refunds are requested during the financial year if €100 mn is insufficient
Estonia PVAs are administered by the Ministry of Social Affairs. They are valid for a minimum of one year, and are obligatory for all pharmaceuticals in the reimbursement system 
(positive list) else products will be 100% co-pay
Pharmaceutical companies are required to state the rationale behind requested prices and volumes. If the Ministry still feels suggested prices are too high, products are not 
reimbursed and/or delisted
If agreed volumes are exceeded, negotiations take place between the Ministry of Social Affairs and the pharmaceutical company to determine the rationale and course of 
action. Agreed actions may include lowering reimbursed prices
No action is a possibility if excessive volumes could not have been foreseen by Ministry personnel and they now believe higher volumes should be funded
France Two schemes exist in France. These include a payback mechanism for excessive sales by therapeutic class and are based on pharmaceutical company’s agreed turnover with 
annual financial adjustments.  They also include regular price reviews based on the average daily costs, the average dose or the total number of units established at the time 
of reimbursement. Payback mechanisms per class are not the same each year
Previous payback schemes have included 65% covered by all companies marketing the drugs in the class and 35% by companies whose sales exceed agreed thresholds
New drugs with an ASMR I are exempt from such agreements for 36 months after launch, ASMR II for 24 months, ASMR III for 24 months at a level of 50% and ASMR IV at a level 
of 25% for 24 months.
Generic are totally exempt
Since 2008 orphan drugs are no longer automatically exempt with total sales of €815 mn in 2008 and growing rapidly, and are now subject to specific agreements with 
payback mechanisms for sales above agreed levels. There were two schemes in 2008; the first involved Naglazyme® - for the treatment for mucopolysaccharide type VI disease 
- and the second involved Soliris® - for the treatment of paroxysmal nocturnal haemoglobinuria
In 2004, total rebates amounted to €670 mn - some 3% of total pharmaceutical expenditure. Rebates were €260 mn in 2008.
Germany Several rebate contracts and other mechanisms exist between the Sickness Funds and pharmaceutical companies to accelerate access and/or enhance market penetration of 
certain drugs where there are concerns with their value. This includes the so called target agreements
Current schemes include the insulin analogues, olanzapine, risperidone, clopidogrel, zolendronate (Aclasta®), mycophenolic acid (Myfortic®), everolimus(Certican®), and 
cyclosporine (Sandimmun®)
There is though typically secrecy between the Sickness Funds and the Pharmaceutical companies concerning crucial issues such as the actual scope, measurements and time 
frames, which can cause problems for the State Physician AssociationsA
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Hungary A general payback scheme has been in operation since 2003 based on individual products as well as total pharmaceutical expenditure
Since January 2007, pricing criteria for pharmaceuticals is regulated by law with only limited exceptions
Under the scheme, companies must pay the Ministry 12% of their total reimbursed sales each year. If this is insufficient to cover the agreed budget overspend, companies must 
pay additional monies according to an agreed formula. For the first 9% of any overspend for a given class, the social health insurance and pharmaceutical companies share 
the cost of the additional overspend, with pharmaceutical companies paying a greater percentage. If the overspend exceeds 9% of the agreed budget, pharmaceutical 
companies cover all the additional costs themselves
Rebates are based on the individual company's share of reimbursed sales for the class. Alongside this, there is also a payback scheme for certain target pharmaceuticals. 
Depending on the individual contract, there are also yearly (or monthly) refunds based on reimbursed sales. There is a sliding scale, with 100% rebates for any over budget 
expenditure above agreed limits for the product
The payback in 2006 was 22.5 billion HUF (€90 mn - 5.69% of the budget)
Italy Compensation schemes exist where there is excessive prescribing and costs of pharmaceuticals above agreed limits. Current limits for pharmaceutical expenditure in primary 
care are 14% of total NHS expenditure and 2.4% of total NHS expenditure in hospital care
Rebates amounted to €773 mn in 2005
Lithuania PVA schemes are administered by the State Patient Fund under the Ministry of Health
From 2008, such schemes are obligatory for all new pharmaceuticals that will increase the Statutory Health Insurance drug budget compared with current treatment 
approaches for the target patient population. Once instigated, PVA scheme are currently valid for a minimum of three years
If agreed sales volume (expenditure) exceeds the agreed target, pharmaceutical companies must refund all the difference
Portugal Since 1997, there have been 4 rebate agreements to limit reimbursed pharmaceutical expenditure signed between the Ministry of Health and the Portuguese Pharmaceutical 
Industry Association (first time the industry association has been involved)
The agreement, signed in February 2006, included both ambulatory care and in-patient hospital expenditure following the instigation of formal Pricing and Reimbursement 
for hospital products (prior to this just ambulatory care). Hospital products were included for the first time as many new expensive medicines are being launched in hospital
The agreement ran from 2006 to 2009. Under this agreement, no growth was permitted in ambulatory care pharmaceutical expenditure in 2006 vs. 2005, with only a nominal 
growth rate in 2007 vs.2006. The rate depended on the actual increase in GDP for that year. The growth rate for in-patient drugs was limited to 4% in 2006 vs. 2005. There are 
exceptions though for new in-patient drugs for cancer and HIV as well as potentially single agents in other disease areas depending on the circumstances. Before this 
agreement, pharmaceutical companies negotiated directly with hospitals
In case of any over budget, companies provide refunds equal to 69.6% of the increase up to maximum of € 35 mn in 2006 and € 45 mn in 2007. Part of this refund is diverted 
to a special fund supporting research
Table 1: Examples of Price Volume Agreements (PVAs)/budget impact schemes in Australia and Europe (Continued)A
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Table 2: Examples of patient access schemes in Australia and Europe including free drug or discounts
Country Examples
Australia There are pricing arrangements for Section 100 drugs (restricted supply of specialist drugs to hospitals or other similar facilities) whereby companies typically 
provide free drugs to lower the cost per unit; alternatively provide an agreed percentage discount to Medicare Australia
Examples include Abacavir - the Pharmaceutical Benefit Scheme would only pay for 2 packs for every 3 supplied, Cirone progesterone gel - Listing was achieved 
with the help of a 49.5% discount, and Deferasirox - a 20% discount was applied to achieve reimbursement
Serbia Patient access schemes were initiated in 2008 to enhance the value of three cancer drugs, namely bevacizumab, cetuximab and mabCampath
For these medicines to be included (reimbursed) in the positive list covered by mandatory health insurance, specific agreements were established between the 
Serbian Health Fund and the manufacturers
Under the terms, the manufacturers agreed to rebate of 25% of the reimbursed costs in 2008; this was reduced to 11% in 2009. One cancer treatment was excluded 
as the manufacturer did not want to enter into the scheme
UK (England, Wales) NICE (National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence) has recently entered into a number of patient access programmes to enhance the value of new medicines
Examples include cetuximab as first line treatment of metastatic colorectal cancer. Under this scheme, Cetuximab will be rebated as free stock (1 vial per 8 utilised) 
when used in combination with FOLFOX. Alternative methods will be found if 'free stock' is not suitable. In addition, patient registration is essential to ensure 
scheme integrity and NICE usage criteria are followed. The Trust pharmacy will carry out a monthly/quarterly audit of usage to make claims from the manufacturer, 
with free stock delivered directly to the Trust
Other examples include Sunitinib for patients with metastatic renal cell carcinoma. Under this scheme, the first treatment cycle (6-weeks costing an average of 
GB£3139/patient) is provided free via a patient access programme. Subsequent cycles are funded by the NHS until disease progression. The Department of Health 
considered the scheme did not constitute an excessive administration burden on the NHS
Sorafenib for metastatic renal cell carcinoma is another example. Under this scheme, the first pack (200 mg × 112 tablets) is provided free by the manufacturer 
under the agreed patient access programme. This equates to £2980.47 p excluding VAT
UK (Scotland) A Patient Access Scheme Assessment Group (PASAG) has recently been established under NHS National Services Scotland reviewing and advising NHS Scotland 
on the feasibility of proposed schemes for implementation. PASAG operates separately from the Scottish Medicines Consortium (SMC) in order to maintain the 
integrity and independence of SMC's assessment process. The first scheme was accepted in November 2009
Schemes accepted by NICE may be implemented in Scotland if the medicine was previously accepted by SMC prior to November 2009 or if the medicine has been 
assessed via the NICE multiple technology appraisal process and the advice has been accepted by NHS Scotland
Examples include cetuximab where the manufacturer estimated that the budget impact in Scotland for suitable patients would increase from £1.8 mn in year 5 to 
£2.5 mn if no patient access scheme was in placeA
d
a
m
s
k
i
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
B
M
C
 
H
e
a
l
t
h
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
2
0
1
0
,
 
1
0
:
1
5
3
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
b
i
o
m
e
d
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
.
c
o
m
/
1
4
7
2
-
6
9
6
3
/
1
0
/
1
5
3
P
a
g
e
 
7
 
o
f
 
1
6
Table 3: Examples of patient access schemes involving price caps in operation in Europe and US
Country Examples
Italy Bevacizumab for the management of approved cancers cannot exceed €25,941 per year
Sweden Stockholm County Council initially signed an agreement in April 2008 lasting until end December 2009 whereby if patients with advanced cancer exceeded an 
accumulated dose of 10,000 mg of bevacizumab, the additional costs would be fully covered by the Company
The scheme has now been extended into 2010
Other regions in Sweden have also been offered similar schemes
UK - England, Wales Schemes include the Ranibizumab Reimbursement Scheme. Under the scheme, the first 14 injections in the eye for the management of wet age-related macular 
degeneration (AMD) are paid for by the national health service with patients demonstrating an 'adequate response' to therapy to continue with treatment. The drug 
costs of any subsequent ranibizumab injections will be reimbursed by the company (Novartis) either as free drug or as a credit note
Other schemes include Lenalidomibe for patients with multiple myeloma who have received prior therapy. This scheme was approved to enhance the cost 
effectiveness of lenalidomibe. Under this scheme, the manufacturer pays the cost of the drug if more than 26 cycles are needed for any patient (approximately 2000 
patients in the UK) - equating to any patient needing more than 2 years of therapy
Ustekinumab for moderate to severe psoriasis is another example. Under this scheme two 45 mg vials (90 mg) are provided for people who weigh more than 100 
kg at the same cost as a single vial in the form of free drug
UK - Scotland Schemes incude'Ranibizumab Reimbursement Scheme - as above
In addition Ustekinumab - as above. SMC estimates that this patient access scheme will minimise the additional budget impact so long as prescribing is in line with 
the manufacturer's proposed positioning
US Programmes were introduced by Genentech in the US in 2006 to cap the total cost of bevacizumab at $55,000 per year for patients below an income of $75,000 per 
year. Costs are a particular issue especially for patients with breast cancer, as well as earlier stages of lung and colon cancer, with the scheme resulting in a 50% 
reduction or more in costs for one year of treatment. The company believed this would help address public concern over the rising prices for cancer drugs
ImClone Systems and Bristol-Myers Squibb announced in 2006 that lower-income patients who reached a price cap of approximately US$10,000 monthly for 
cetuximab could receive additional supplies at no extra cost, or at a large discount. This administered through an independent charitable programme
Amgen in 2006 introduced the Oncology Assistance (AOA) programme to provide financial assistance for patients prescribed panitumumab for the treatment of 
metastatic colorectal cancer when co-payments reached 5% of patient's adjusted gross income. This administered via a Foundation
Pfizer recently launched the MAINTAIN scheme running from 1 July 2009 to 31 December 2009. Under the scheme, Pfizer will help patients who have recently made 
redundant to continue obtaining their medicines
There are also a number of assistance programmes for patients with HIV both for antiviral drugs to treat the disease as well as side-effects of therapy. Eligible patients 
include those with low income not covered by existing programmes including Medicare Part D
In addition, Managed Care Organisations have also instigated maximum dose policies with manufacturers to reduce their exposure, e.g. United HealthcareA
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Table 4: Examples of performance-based or outcome-based models in Canada, Europe and US
Country Examples
Canada Sandoz Canada promised to reimburse individuals, hospitals and government drug plans where patients with treatment-resistant schizophrenia discontinued 
clozapine within six months. This was initiated to address acquisition cost concerns versus typical anti-psychotics among the Provinces
Merck-Frost offered to reimburse provincial governments the full cost if patients prescribed finasteride subsequently required surgery for benign prostatic 
hyperplasia after one full year of medical therapy
Sanofi-Aventis agreed to reimburse the cost of docetaxel to provincial payers if an agreed responder level was not reached in patients with cancer due to concerns 
about its efficacy and costs. The programme lasted six months facilitating formulary listing
Denmark A population based 'no cure, no pay' strategy for valsartan to lower BP was initiated to enhance market share
Money back initiative for nicotine chewing gum if patients do not like the taste of any of the four flavours on offer
'No play; no pay' schemes for drugs for erectile dysfunction
Italy i) CRONOS scheme for Alzheimer drugs
Initially the acetyl cholinesterase inhibitors were 'C' classification in Italy, i.e. 100% co-payment
However, under the CRONOS scheme, companies initially provided acetyl cholinesterase inhibitors such as donepezil free of charge to specialist clinics for the first 
four months of treatment
The NHS subsequently covered the drug costs in responders, with patient outcomes recorded
This observational study, which demonstrated health gain in patients with mild to moderate AD, resulted in the NHS subsequently funding these drugs ('A' 
classification) provided patients were treated in specialist outpatients. However, there were no quality checks on the completed forms
ii) Ongoing registries to monitor prescribing and therapeutic value in practice
A number of registers have been initiated in Italy to monitor prescribing against licensed indications as well as monitor their therapeutic value in practice to guide 
future management and reimbursed prices
This includes a number of premium priced drugs such as cetuximab, ibritumonab tiuxetan, lenalidormibe, nelarabine, palifermin, temporfin and trastuzumumab 
for adjuvant use
Overall over 43,000 Italian patients have been included in the registries for new cancer medicines (up to Oct 2009)A
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UK - England and Wales i) Beta interferon for multiple sclerosis (MS)
NICE in its initial appraisal rejected funding for the β interferons in the treatment of MS on clinical and cost-effectiveness grounds with a calculated a cost/QALY 
of £42,000 to £98,000 over 20 years rising to a maximum of £780,000/QALY over 5-years
Following external pressure, the government in 2002 established a scheme with the four manufacturers whereby a cohort of approximately 10,000 patients would 
be followed for over 10 years with the cost of drugs reduced or refunds given if the cost/QALY over an envisaged 20-year horizon was over £35,000/QALY, i.e. fund 
a maximum value of £35,000/QALY or less
Patients would be followed using the Kurtzke Expanded Disability Status Scale (EDSS), which was the same outcome measure used in the trials
However, the scheme has been heavily criticised as unscientific and impractical
An initial assessment was published in 2009 reviewing patients who started treatment from May 2002 to April 2005. This highlighted important methodological 
issues with this study and the need for longer term follow-up before securing meaningful results
ii) Bortezomib for the treatment of first relapse of multiple myeloma
This scheme is based on a 50% reduction in serum paraprotein levels (M-protein) by the fourth cycle. The NHS will continue funding treatment in responders, with 
the cost/QALY reduced from £38,000/QALY to a more acceptable £20,700/QALY, with manufacturers refunding the cost of the drug if a 50% reduction was not 
achieved. This is usually in the form of free drug, which is seen as easier to implement
In addition, prices remain at the launch price despite up to a 60% discount in reality, which is important with the UK often used as a reference price country
However there have been concerns whether M-protein is a good surrogate for life expectancy. Alongside this, 10 to 15% of patients do not have measurable serum 
M-protein levels
iii) Atorvastatin for CHD prevention
The pharmaceutical company agreed to fund the health authority for wasted resources if atorvastatin failed to reduce LDL-C levels to agreed targets when patients 
have been properly titrated
No refunds were given in reality as all properly titrated patients reached target lipid levels helped by the recruitment of two nurses. The nurses worked with GPs 
and practice nurses aiding issues such as concordance, although a 20% adjustment was included in the outcome guarantee model
GP and patient participation was helped by CHD being a high priority disease area in the UK with national initiatives to improve care
However, there were problems with the scheme once generic simvastatin became available and lipid level targets were lowered in the UK
iv) Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) proposals
Under the proposed flexible Value-Based Pricing (VBP) in the new PPRS scheme, pharmaceutical companies will be able to establish the initial launch price for their 
new products
Reimbursed prices will either fall or rise as new evidence of effectiveness and safety becomes available, or when new indications are added changing the overall 
value, following further appraisals by NICE
UK - Scotland Beta interferon for multiple sclerosis (as for England)
PPRS proposals apply to Scotland although the implementation of flexible pricing is still being discussed
US • Patients and insurers were refunded if simvastatin failed to lower LDL to target levels (up to 6 months)
• CIGNA agreed with pharmaceutical companies that they would reimburse the cost of treating a heart attack if this occurred whilst patients were being treated 
with lipid lowering drugs
• 'No cure, no pay' for valsartan and valsartan hydrochlorothiazide to patients and insures as part of a 'take action for healthy blood pressure' initiative. In addition 
a number of compliance enhancing initiatives were simultaneously launched by the company to help achieve BP target goals including the option to purchase a 
blood pressure monitoring device at significantly reduced costs
• Merck agreed to refund the cost of the drug for patients whose symptoms of benign prostatic hyperplasia did not improve within six months or who required 
surgery within two years assessed based on pre-determined criteria
Others (no particular 
country)
• 'No baby - no pay' option for fertility treatments funded through national health services
Table 4: Examples of performance-based or outcome-based models in Canada, Europe and US (Continued)Adamski et al. BMC Health Services Research 2010, 10:153
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/10/153
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impact schemes - and patient access schemes including
price capping schemes are included in Table 1[12,13,
28,36,43-53], Table 2[20,29,33,34,54-57] and Table 3[5,
19-21,24,31,32,34,58-68]. This is not a complete list but
aims to give a number of examples.
Any further discussion on specific patient access pro-
grammes in the US is outside the scope of this paper.
Table 4 gives details of performance-based or outcome-
based models in Canada, Europe and USA [10,19,20,25-
27,34,40,51,69-77]. Again, this is not an exhaustive list
but aims at giving a number of examples.
In addition to these schemes, the Italian Medicines
Agency (AIFA) has recently instigated two different
approaches to accelerate reimbursement for new drugs
especially where there is limited data available at launch.
These include variations on patient access schemes as
well as performance-based/outcome contracts [5,34,51].
The AIFA Oncologic Working Group suggested two risk
sharing arrangements for new anti-cancer medicines to
enhance their reimbursement potential based on:
• Epidemiological data for the disease
• The possibility to clearly define a subset of the pop-
ulation responsive to the treatment
• Results from the submitted clinical trials
Six products were included in the scheme with a fur-
ther product added in 2009 [5,34,51]. These were:
• Bevacizumab - Metastatic carcinoma of the colon or 
rectum, breast cancer, NSCLC and advanced and/or 
metastatic renal cell cancer
• Dasatinib - Chronic myeloid leukaemia and acute 
lymphoblastic leukaemia
• Erlotinib - NSCLC after failure of at least one prior 
chemotherapy regimen
• Nilotinib - Chronic myeloid leukaemia
• Lapatinib - HER2+ breast cancer patients
• Sorafenib - Second line treatment for renal cell car-
cinoma and hepatocellular carcinoma
• Sunitinib - Metastatic renal cell carcinoma (first and 
second line treatment)
Inclusion in either risk sharing scheme depended on
the characteristics of the drug and the tumour type and
included:
• Erlotinib, sunitinib and sorafenib - provided at 50% 
discount from current prices for an agreed number of 
cycles. In the case of erlotinib this is 2 months; 12 
weeks for sunitinib and sorafenib. As a result, with 
erlotinib part funding the 50% of patients who would 
be expected to have disease progression at or before 8 
weeks of treatment
• Dasatinib and lapatinib - the Italian Health Service 
fully covers the cost of drugs for the responders fol-
lowing assessment; manufacturers refunding the 
costs in the case of disease progression
Four new drugs are also currently contained within the
Italian conditional reimbursement scheme [34,51]. This is
similar to the US Centre for Medicare and Medicaid con-
ditional coverage scheme under which conditions are set
for the continued reimbursement of new technologies
[5,34,39]. The current scheme in Italy covers ivabradine
for chronic angina pectoris, as well as exenatide, sitaglip-
tin and vildagliptin for patients with Type 2 diabetes
resistant to current oral treatments [34,51]. Under this
scheme, AIFA fully reimburses the new drugs until fur-
ther re-evaluation of their actual level of innovation. The
main objectives being to evaluate utilisation in routine
clinical practice, collect epidemiologic data as well as
obtain data on the effectiveness and safety of the new
drugs in practice. The measures used to assess effective-
ness of the new drugs for diabetes are HbA1c levels. It is
the number of angina episodes for new drugs for chronic
angina pectoris. By the end of 2008, over 17,000 patients
had been enrolled with 7% withdrawals due to therapeu-
tic failure [51]. More recent schemes for new anti-dia-
betic drugs in Italy have concentrated on co-utilisation
with either metformin or sulphonyl ureas. This is because
these new drugs should only be prescribed if HbA1c lev-
els are not controlled with existing regimens, or there are
unacceptable side-effects with existing drugs at pre-
scribed doses.
Concerns with current schemes
There are already a considerable number of 'risk sharing'
schemes in operation globally. However, there are con-
cerns with existing schemes that need be addressed
before they should become a routine part of future reim-
bursement or contracting negotiations especially given
the suspicion among payers that a number of proposed
schemes are extensions of pharmaceutical company mar-
keting activities.
Whilst price-volume agreements (PVA) shift cost con-
siderations from the payer to the pharmaceutical com-
pany, which is important especially if there are concerns
that new medicines will be prescribed in a wider popula-
tion than envisaged, there are concerns that the patients
initially prescribed the drug will not always be those most
likely to gain the greatest benefit [10,36]. The growing use
of health informatics can help here. In addition, PVA
schemes may not always consider issues such as compli-
ance, which is a growing issue with the recent study by
Cramer and colleagues showing that only 59% of patients
take their cardiovascular and antidiabetic medication for
more than 80% of days on therapy each year [78]. There
are also concerns that pharmaceutical companies may
additionally benefit from early access of new technologies
with as yet unproven efficacy and safety even within such
schemes unless the value of the new drugs has been criti-
c a l l y  ev a l u a t e d  b y  t r a i n e d  p r o f e s s i o n a l s.  H o w ev e r ,  i t  i sAdamski et al. BMC Health Services Research 2010, 10:153
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recognised PVA schemes may be the optimal method to
finance new medicines especially where there are cur-
rently limited demand side measures to control off-label
prescribing or prescribing in patient populations where
the new medicine is less cost-effective [36,79].
Physician Association concerns in Germany with dis-
count and rebate initiatives between Pharmaceutical
Companies and the Sickness Funds in Germany include a
lack of transparency. This can create problems for the
Physician Associations in calculating and monitoring
drug budgets as well as providing prescribing guidance to
meet their responsibility to monitor and manage drug
budgets and advise physicians when their allocated bud-
gets are likely to be breached. This is especially important
in Germany as physicians can be fined for being over
budget [80]. Physician Association advice can be different
to the advice given by Sickness Fund personnel to ambu-
latory care physicians to help improve the quality and
efficiency of their prescribing especially if the value of
discussed drugs is altered by discounts given by pharma-
ceutical companies. Matters can be further complicated
when rebates and discounts are given for one drug on
condition that there will be a predefined increase in utili-
sation and expenditure of a second drug.
This is different to the US where combined or bundling
of rebates is now generally discouraged by Managed Care
Organisations (MCOs) as it impedes transparency. This is
particularly important where rebates are passed onto
patients. As a result, contracts are increasingly focusing
on individual drugs. Proposals for formulary inclusion
are also increasingly being considered for drugs where
there is support to improve adherence and compliance
given concerns that poor compliance could severely com-
promise effectiveness potentially leading to increased
medical and/or drug expenditure in practice to produce
the desired clinical outcomes [78,81-83]. MCOs such as
Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey are con-
ducting research to improve the understanding of barri-
ers to enhance compliance, with the findings likely to be
incorporated into future initiatives including formulary
listing considerations. Having said this, the first consider-
ation for formulary inclusion of new medicines should
always be their comparative efficacy and safety versus
current formulary drugs. Only when two medicines are
seen as essentially similar will the inclusion of schemes
aimed at enhancing adherence and compliance be consid-
ered for potential formulary listing. Alongside this, 'price
protection' clauses are also now being written into some
contracts where manufacturers have sought price
increases in the past.
Concerns with patient access schemes involving free
drug or discounts include opportunity costs, even if this
reduces the overall cost/QALY for the new product, as
this could still result in significant additional cost for the
payers. Alongside this, the administrative burden associ-
ated with additional patient monitoring as well as collat-
ing and submitting information are also concerns.
Concerns with price capping schemes again include the
administrative burden such as proof that only appropriate
patients have been incorporated into the scheme and that
they have reached the agreed limit. This is especially
important when the number of patients where these will
be applicable in reality is low. For example, there is only
one eligible patient in Serbia that would currently qualify
under the price capping scheme for bevacizumab in oper-
ation in either Italy or Sweden (Table 3). Alongside this,
obtaining replacement stock or credit can be a lengthy
process especially if manufacturers operate via wholesal-
ers. Such processes may also impact on the accuracy of
local medicine utilisation systems making future compar-
isons difficult. Lastly, pharmaceutical companies may
wish to help with data collection and verification, which
has to be denied if there are issues with patient integrity.
There are a number of objections with performance-
based or outcomes-based models. These include
[4,9,10,20,34,36,41,81,84-90]:
• Whether the objective of the scheme is fully explicit
• Whether the level of evidence is sufficient to make 
robust decisions initially. This includes whether there 
is a sufficiently strong correlation between any surro-
gate measures included in the phase III trials and the 
postulated health gain. This also includes concerns if 
meta analyses have been undertaken with only indi-
rect comparisons. Limited outcome data also makes it 
difficult to undertake any sub-group analysis to ascer-
tain potential patient populations where the value of 
new drugs will be greatest
• Who will fund additional evidence generation given 
the high acquisition costs of most new technologies 
and concerns that considerable expenditure will be 
spent on marketing activities to promote new drugs 
rather than spent on further clinical trials
• Who will fund drug provision if rebated drugs go 
out of date before suitable patients can be found
• The reliability of registry and other data generation 
schemes unless comparable control groups. Concerns 
can be diminished if subsequent studies are under-
taken by independent organisations
• Accelerating the uptake of new drugs in practice, i.e. 
including patients in registry studies or provisional 
reimbursement schemes may accelerate their uptake 
in practice. The utilisation of new drugs may also be 
greater if companies provide additional support such 
as nurses to help with case finding and monitoring. 
This may be balanced though through reducing 'off 
label' use if physicians know prescribed indications 
are being monitored.Adamski et al. BMC Health Services Research 2010, 10:153
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/10/153
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• The length of follow up - especially if this is long (β 
interferon scheme in the UK - below)
• The general administrative burden for all key stake-
holders. This also includes the costs associated with 
the instigation of additional evaluation units such as 
those proposed by NICE in England. The PASAG 
(Patient Access Scheme Assessment Group) is already 
established in Scotland to help evaluate proposed risk 
sharing schemes; similarly the Patient Access Scheme 
Liaison Unit within NICE. Both units are already add-
ing to the administrative burden of current risk shar-
ing schemes
• Compliance - especially for long term chronic con-
ditions. This issue must be fully addressed where per-
tinent else all key stakeholder groups will lose out
• Pricing, i.e. pharmaceutical companies may be 
tempted to initially over price their new drug in 
expectation of price cuts/cost shifting downstream as 
the evidence base grows
On the other hand, pay-for-performance schemes do
encourage pharmaceutical companies to develop bio-
markers or other methods that help target patient popu-
lations where health gain and hence value is greatest. This
is especially important for new cancer drugs given the
limited aggregate health gain of most new drugs includ-
ing those for cancer and their appreciable cost per patient
[9].
There have been a number of concerns with the β inter-
feron scheme for multiple sclerosis in the UK, which need
to be considered by payers when evaluating future
schemes [25,40,91-93]. These include:
• The model
• Flaws in the actual model due to difficulties in fully 
mapping out the quality of life and natural history of 
MS to the trial outcomes, which were based on 
changes in EDSS scores (Expanded Disability Status 
Score)
• Concerns that the model was heavily influenced by 
assumptions about future discounting and did not 
account for example for the cost of azathioprine
• The model did not appear to fully account for 
patients discontinuing treatment early because of 
side-effects
• The length of follow-up
• Concerns that within ten years the β interferons and 
glatiramer acetate may have been supplanted by 
newer drugs reducing the whole rationale behind the 
scheme
• Funding and administration support
• Primary Care Trusts generally did not receive any 
additional funding to cover the cost of these drugs
• Hospitals also did not receive additional funding for 
more extensive follow-up consultations and for com-
pleting the necessary forms reducing their involve-
ment in practice
• Concerns generally with the necessary infrastruc-
ture required including specialist nurses as well as 
concerns where the costs of the additional adminis-
trative burden would come from
The administrative burden, lack of communication, and
concerns with passing on savings have all been high-
lighted as key issues with current schemes for cancer
drugs in the UK [41]. Recent research among hospitals
yielded [41]:
• 73% of hospitals reported they did not have the capac-
ity to manage current schemes as these typically required
additional staff to manage, co-ordinate and track them.
This is especially the case if hospital personnel have to
spend valuable time manually tracking patients, retro-
spectively adjusting stock control systems and ensuring
necessary financial systems are in place to fully realise
any savings
• A need for greater flexibility around the time limits
for processing claims
• A need for good communication between key stake-
holder groups, e.g. in the case of bortezomib every
missed claim results in a loss of GB£12,000
• The need to ensure savings are passed back to the
payers - this is not happening in 47% of hospitals
These findings again highlight concerns with existing
s c h e m e s  t h a t  n e e d  t o  b e  a d e q u a t e l y  a d d r e s s e d  i n  t h e
future before risk sharing schemes become a routine part
of future reimbursement considerations.
Conclusions and future proposals
We believe there are only a limited number of situations
where 'risk sharing' schemes should be considered in the
future, as well as key issues that need to be considered by
payers before entering into future 'risk sharing' arrange-
ments. These are summarised below and have arisen due
to the increasing launch of new expensive technologies
putting considerable strain on European healthcare sys-
tems. They do not apply to the classical PVA/budget
impact schemes, which have been discussed earlier.
Situations where risk sharing schemes could be consid-
ered by payers in the future include where:
• the objectives and scope of the scheme are explicit
and transparent
• the new drug is a novel treatment in a high priority
disease area with expected net health gain, and there are
currently few if any effective treatments. In addition,
translational science suggests good effectiveness in reality
and delaying treatment before all the outcome data is
available may not be in key stakeholder's interest. This
can subsequently be verified by independent studiesAdamski et al. BMC Health Services Research 2010, 10:153
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/10/153
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• new drugs are seen as effective in priority disease
areas but there are potential concerns with long term
safety
• new drugs could have a substantial beneficial impact
on service delivery and patient safety in practice but it has
been difficult to prove this within the confines of a phase
III trial
• the likely health gain can be determined within a lim-
ited time frame. This is especially important in patients
with advanced cancers in order not to waste time and
resources
• proposed patient access schemes in priority disease
areas substantially lower health service costs to enhance
reimbursement having factored in all administrative
costs. This must though take into account the possibility
of rebated drugs going out-of-date before they can be
used or whether current systems have the ability to fully
track patients and potential rebates, e.g. the cost of
missed claims with bortezomid (above). Overall, rebate
schemes do appear to provide a more accurate record of
drug usage than the provision of free drug, as well as help
ensure only appropriate patients are prescribed the new
drug, enhancing their appeal
We believe proposed risk sharing schemes should be
rejected where:
• effective and low cost standards already exist for the
population in question with proven long term outcomes.
This includes provisional reimbursement schemes which
may encourage companies to launch new expensive prod-
ucts with only limited surrogate data
• Health Authorities will end up funding a substantial
proportion of a new drug's development costs
• patient compliance is a key consideration to improve
health, and this has not been adequately addressed in the
proposed scheme
• there is a high administrative burden for the health
s e r v i c e  v e r s u s  t h e  l i k e l y  h e a l t h  g a i n  a n d / o r  p e r c e i v e d
financial benefits
In addition, proposed schemes must be based on robust
evidence ('coverage with evidence') for potential consid-
eration. This includes robust translational science which
has suggested beneficial outcomes in reality. Schemes
must also include unambiguous and easily measured 'evi-
dence based' effectiveness criteria evolved from good bio-
logical research and comprehensive clinical trials. Where
there is insufficient evidence to make robust decisions,
we believe reimbursement or funding should initially be
considered only at similar prices to current standards.
Prices can subsequently be increased in all or sub-popu-
lations as more data becomes available demonstrating
increased value in practice. In this way limiting the finan-
cial exposure of payers as well as limiting Type 1 errors.
We believe key considerations when payers are review-
ing proposed schemes include transparency, ethical con-
siderations, staffing, evaluation and exit strategies.
Transparency and ethical considerations include:
• Funding arrangements for any registries as well as 
administration costs must be transparent
• Any ethical, legal and clinical governance consider-
ations must be fully addressed when proposing and 
developing future schemes. This includes issues of 
ownership of the data, especially if schemes are oper-
ated within health services, intellectual property 
rights and opportunities for appeal
• Future risk sharing schemes should be open to all 
pertinent companies and not just selected companies. 
This builds on the established procurement pro-
cesses, and could be in the form of 'requests for risk 
sharing' schemes among competing companies in 
given disease areas/patient populations
Staffing/funding considerations include whether:
• Appropriate professionals are in place to fully evalu-
ate proposed schemes, otherwise decisions may be 
compromised. This includes clinical, clinical pharma-
cology, pharmacy, IT and economic experts
• Continued funding of competent personnel (clinical 
and IT), as well as comprehensive IT infrastructures, 
is in place to effectively develop and implement fol-
low-up registries where pertinent
• There are high ethical standards in the evaluation of 
proposed schemes. This includes the declaration of 
any contacts and conflicts of interest between experts 
and pharmaceutical companies that could potentially 
jeopardise evaluations
Finally, we believe evaluations must be built into future
schemes based on good science given the paucity of pub-
lished studies to date and concerns with many current
schemes. In the past, pharmaceutical companies may
have been unwilling to broadcast their schemes especially
patient access schemes. However, there are now estab-
lished payer networks to address this, and publication is
seen as a major way forward for health authorities to
learn from each another. Any evaluation must include the
overall costs involved with implementing and conducting
the schemes as well as their outcome. 'Exit' strategies
must also be considered in advance should the effective-
ness and/or safety of new drugs turn out to be worse in
reality leading to their possible withdrawal during the
lifetime of the scheme.
Consequently we believe future schemes must have
realistic time scales, must not involve appreciable admin-
istrative burden if part of routine clinical care unless
addressed, and must take cognisance of any likely
changes in care during their lifetime, i.e. standard drugs
losing their patent and/or clinical standards changing.
W e hope that this paper will stimulate further debate
and discussion especially in Europe about future riskAdamski et al. BMC Health Services Research 2010, 10:153
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/10/153
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sharing arrangements for pharmaceuticals amongst all
key stakeholder groups.
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